Journal of Scientific Papers

ECONOMICS & SOCIOLOGY


© CSR, 2008-2019
ISSN 2071-789X

3.1
2019CiteScore
 
91th percentile
Powered by  Scopus



Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ)


Strike Plagiarism

Partners
  • General Founder and Publisher:

     
    Centre of Sociological Research

     

  • Publishing Partners:


    The journal is co-financed in the years 2022-2024 by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Poland in the framework of the ministerial programme “Development of Scientific Journals” (RCN) on the basis of contract no. RCN/SN/0668/2021/1. Subsidy amount: 95 000 PLN   


    University of Szczecin (Poland)

    Széchenyi István University, (Hungary)

    Mykolas Romeris University (Lithuania)

    Alexander Dubcek University of Trencín (Slovak Republic)


  • Membership:

     

    Society for Scholarly Publishing (SSP)

    American Sociological Association


    European Sociological Association


    World Economics Association (WEA)

     


    CrossRef

     


Overbidding in contests – can nudging decrease expenditures? Experimental evidence

Vol. 18, No 1, 2025

Marta Sylwestrzak

 

University of Warsaw,

Warsaw, Poland

E-mail: martasylwestrzak@wne.uw.edu.pl

ORCID 0000-0002-7809-5826

 

Overbidding in contests – can nudging decrease expenditures? Experimental evidence

 

 

 


 

Abstract. This paper examines overbidding in contests and the potential of default options (nudges) to reduce expenditures and enhance cooperative behavior. The study is based on an online laboratory experiment (N = 222), using a 2x2 design with two treatment factors: contest type (winner-take-all [WTA] vs. proportional prize [PP]) and the presence or absence of a nudge. Participants were divided into three-person groups and urge to decide how many tokens to invest in intergroup contests. The WTA contest determined the probability of winning the prize based on the relative expenditures of the groups, while the PP contest distributed rewards proportionally. The nudge, introduced in two of the four scenarios, involved setting a default contribution level, allowing for the investigation of its impact on expenditures and coordination. We found that expenditures exceeded the predicted optimal levels across all treatments but decreased over successive rounds. The PP contest with the nudge resulted in the lowest expenditures and least resource wastage, leading to the highest participant payoffs. Even though the WTA contest with the default option showed the highest expenditures, these findings highlight the effectiveness of nudges under this setting in promoting efficient resource use overall and suggest that behavioral interventions can significantly impact expenditure patterns in competitive environments. The research contributes to the broader debate on economic and social interactions, offering insights into strategies for improving resource management and cooperation in both local and global contexts.

 

Received: March, 2024

1st Revision: January, 2025

Accepted: March, 2025

 

DOI: 10.14254/2071-789X.2025/18-1/7

JEL ClassificationC92, D90

Keywords: overbidding, winner-take-all contest, proportional prize contest, nudge, group decision-making