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THE CONCEPT OF LABOUR MIGRATION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

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ABSTRACT. The present paper overviews academic literature and statistics related to labour migration in part where it concerns Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), with special attention paid to Hungary. It aims to discover the main notions and results of European migration along with potential future trends. The paper, inter alia, focuses on the changing characteristics of host countries' labour markets and demographic profiles. It has found that CEE's involvement in intercontinental migration is expected to continue, and is driven by demographic and economic catalysts. Therefore, to address all related issues and map trends, not only an economic perspective is required. The conclusion is that preparation for integration of the newly arrived labour force is a permanent ongoing task for all employers and policymakers, as well as for the entire society.

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Introduction

For identifying migrant workers, many definitions have already been invented, for example, the International Labour Organization determines the phenomenon as “all international migrants who are currently employed or (...) seeking employment in their present country of residence” (ILO, 2015). We opt to use this terminology because neither ethnicity, nor citizenship is covered under such a perspective. In this context, countries are regularly divided into sending and host countries (Engbersen & Snel, 2013). However, they

might change their status depending on their own and their neighbours' economic and social conditions. Apart from poorer income prospects such as minimal wages (Rausser et al., 2018), ethnic incentives and cultural proximity are also expected to trigger migration. This assumption used to be highly prevalent after the political transition in Central and Eastern Europe (Favell & Hansen, 2002; Jileva, 2002) and after the end of the World War II (Schiffauer & Schiffauer, 2017). The current study suggests that this statement is still valid. To understand the present tendencies and notions around labour migration, some historical events that established long-lasting social and economic processes accountable for labour migration have to be taken under consideration.

The diminished border control on European continent boosted migration in an underestimated volume (e. g., Alvarez-Plata et al, 2003; Dustman et al., 2003). While only a few hundreds of thousands were envisioned, a half million solely Polish citizens moved to the UK only in 2007 (Schiffauer & Schiffauer). In comparison with other Eastern European countries, there are numerous studies discussing both Polish emigration and immigration.

The explanation of migration with cultural, psychological, social (Bodó, 2016) attributes is a typically Western European and American approach (Boeri, 2010; Simionescu et al., 2016; Oláh et al., 2017). Driven by the scarcity of multiple perspectives, the current study overviewed academic literature and statistics, and presented the findings on CEE specifically (Constant & Zimmerman, 2013), with special attention being paid to Hungary.

The reason putting Hungary into the spotlight lays in the fact that this country has been experiencing a greater volume of labour influx than its regional counterparts (Simionescu et al., 2016).

Labour migration is a durable phenomenon which is becoming a long-term challenge for both employers and policymakers (Cseh-Papp et al., 2018; Simionescu, 2016). And this is the starting point in this study.

1. Literature review

In 2019, 82.3 million migrants lived in Europe. That accounted for 11 percent of the continent's population (UN DESA, 2019). In CEE, the figures ranged from 6 to 20 percent. The Balkan suffers the most from emigration and decrease in the population (Jakup, 2016). Another source states that, Central Europe and Scandinavia have a positive "migratory balance". Melegh and Sárosi (2015) wrote that Hungary's emigrated population was lower in comparison with other countries in the region. According to Jakup (2016), it is the lowest in particular. Since the Schengen Agreement has granted free movement for labour force, Eastern and Southern Europe constantly exudes people to the Western and Northern regions of the continent. Economically prosperous countries have more favourable rates of migration stock, while, in the meantime, moderately developed post-Soviet states are associated with the lowest figures.

The most popular destinations are France, Germany and the United Kingdom (Ebell & Warren, 2016). However, their labour market has not saturated. That is because citizenship is never granted easily, not even for the second or third generations of immigrants. Due to this discriminatory pressure, people return to their homes eventually (Seifert, 1997). Foreigners, who applied for citizenship, are usually motivated by family reasons (Cseh-Papp et al, 2018). Schiffauer and Schiffauer (2017) also stated that despite the EU's supranational legal framework, member states' national administration pursues the prevention of "abusing social benefits" by migrants. Measures to deport immigrant workers proliferated along the rising unemployment level as a consequence of financial crisis (Pettigrew et al, 2007) and during the oil crisis in the 1970's (Schiffauer & Schiffauer, 2017). Switzerland is an excellent example for how indiscriminate nature of immigration policy can attract labour migrants. Such

policymaking is motivated by the dependency on foreign expertise in certain high-end economic branches, for instance, in health care (Dia, 2018). For people with politically unstable background, accepting policies are more relevant than economic premises. Mikó (2017) and Dominique (2006) proved that upon analysing Poland's and former Yugoslavian migration purposes in the past century. Labour migrants tend to be highly qualified (Lazányiet al., 2017) and work in highly skilled and rewarded occupations. As a result, the domestic economy is dependent on their contribution. Resembling to the UK regarding the Brexit (Simionescu et al, 2017; 2019).

According to a more abstract definition, migration is the “response to changes in living conditions caused by population growth, development of production and trade, formation of countries, states, nations, climatic conditions, as well as violent causes, such as wars” (Grenčíková et al, 2018). In line with that, not mere financial interest produces migration. Researchers also make difference between temporary and permanent labour migration (Baršova & Barša, 2005). The initial notions triggering them are similar; however, the manner they change as time passes by can mainly be explained by non-economic features as inspired above. As the circumstances change, the population migrates. If labour market conditions change, labour force migrates accordingly (Cseh-Papp et al, 2018). It is the more variable external side. As a novice, we complement this approach with the relevance of social networks, cultural background, psychological drivers, ethnicity and social capital following the implications of Institute for Research into Superdiversity (2015). Herein ethnicity is interpreted as “an aspect of relationship, not a cultural property of a group” (Kapitány, 2013). The listed items are long-lasting inner influencers.

In CEE, migratory patterns are basically explained by ethnic affiliation (Molodikova, 2008a; Csedő, 2010). Upon the fall of autocratic systems, people gained courage from the sudden freedom and pursued better living conditions elsewhere (Simionescu et al, 2016). Yet, despite economic and social conditions offered by the host countries, they usually return to their homes eventually (Sandu, 2010). If economic motives weighted more, they should not have done so. We addressed this peculiarity with a more concentrated research. Hence, even fresher, multi-perspective studies question the interrelation of GDP and net migration (Cajka et al, 2014).

Interdisciplinary studies are scarce in front of Central and Eastern Europe (Simionescu, 2016), so we focused on that area, occasionally highlighting Hungarian features. According to our experience, Hungary is under-researched compared to Poland, which is regarded as its “fellow country”. We aimed to add to this scarce knowledge. Hungary is experiencing heavy influx of foreign labour force; some other researches hold the same for the entire CEE (Simionescu et al, 2016).

Why had not large-scale economic migration been realised? Researchers, who envisaged it, failed to devote attention to other influential aspects, and had focused on the economic disparities among European countries, between Eastern and Western, Southern and Northern European states. However, once it got noted that this break line has weak explanatory ability, researchers' interest swayed toward linguistic, ethnic, cultural and psychological characteristics (Schiffauer & Schiaffauer, 2017; Bodó, 2016) as well as toward the demographic features of the country and particularly its emigrant population (Streimikiene et al, 2016). The chance for successful identification (emotional integration) of foreigners correlates to their level of interest toward the host country's customs and traditions (Cseh-Papp et al, 2018). It was already indicated above that ethnical background and cultural proximity do count, as countries attempt to lure back their fellows (Hungary-Romania). On the other hand, Simionescu (2016) found that between 1991 and 2014, Romanian people permanently left their home because of low earnings. It also bears some contradiction, since emigrating people are rarely coming from the poorest regions of Romania (Goschin et al,

2013). Interestingly, economic downturn in terms of unemployment rate, reduces net migration, the opposite happens if GDP rate is taken as an independent variable (Simionescu et al, 2016).

2. Methodological approach

In this conceptual paper, we used secondary data sources to set up our model. Journal articles were examined primarily, while secondly quantitative datasets and legal taxonomies were extracted from international organisations and research institutes: EU, European Commission, Eurostat, OECD, UN, Department of Economic and social Affairs, International Labour Organization, International Organization for Migration, UNCTAD and the World Bank. The unprocessed data facilitated deductions and testing of existing theories and a tested hypothesis is at halfway “between validation and usefulness” (Weick, 1989). The present paper introduces assumptions deriving from the literature.

The time interval of the analysed data was large, but we found it justified by the topic. Ethnical roots and cultural features are long-lasting items and formulated by historical happenings (House et al, 2004). That is true for the demographic, societal and economic outcomes as well.

For evading the inclusion of obsolete findings, we did not retrieve journal articles before 2004. This date is the time of the EU accession for Central and Eastern Europe that opened up new perspectives and created new circumstances. The transition was called “Europeanisation” by Gheorghe and Common in 2011.


Beside the mentioned period, taking Europe as the area of study was the other inclusion criteria or filter. We did not refuse any legitimate research method, because relying on variable methods can serve with a broader angle of view (Gilson & Goldberg, 2015) and the final output will be more valuable. Contrary to the traditional, rigid methods of low number of analysed papers (Hodkinson & Ford, 2014), we reviewed relatively many. In order to provide a comprehensive overview, we could not engage exclusively in any specific scientific field or methodology, what also justifies and leads to our large list of references.

For gathering qualitative material, we conducted keyword research in ResearchGate and ScienceDirect databases, in six rounds. Based on the hypothesis, during each round, we used “labour migrations”, “Central-Eastern Europe” and “integration”. At this stage, we read papers thoroughly, which ones had overlaps among the three phrases. Afterwards, we ended up with the empirical basis of the study. For gathering data, five additional paths were defined after the first round, while sticking to the three constant terms. These were the followings:

- Cultural roots and ethnicity;
- Circular/temporary migration or mobility;
- Economic consequences of labour migration:
 - Perspective of the sending countries,
 - Perspective of the receiving countries;
- Demographic patterns of Central and Eastern Europe, present and future.

Historically, Hungary as well as CEE has been suffering from massive emigration for a century from now. Nevertheless, statistical records (OECD, Eurostat, Hungarian Central Statistical Office, etc.) report heavy influx of mainly Asian labourers and students since the financial crisis. The phenomenon is altering the current demographic situation. Therefore, the relation between the total and the economically active population was the next point we addressed. There are numerous scenarios and predictions applying a wide range of methodologies in this respect. However, introducing them all would be beyond the scope and volume of this study, hence, this was the point where our research ended. The reader will see

though, that we found researches, whose results were contradicting each other. We did not aim to decide over their validity, only to flash light to an unclarified phenomenon or theory. An interesting remark is the growing number of reflective researches. It seems that the issue of labour migration is becoming increasingly popular in several scientific disciplines. We portrayed that in *Graph 1*, and organized the division on the abscissa with intervals. We did not include methodology-related sources, only the ones touching our paper's topic. Solely journal articles were included, 59 pieces altogether.



Graph 1. Publishing Date and Number of Reviewed Articles
Source: *Own compilation*

We found that in CEE and especially in Hungary, labour migration is under-researched. We conclude that European migration-related research materials have been growing faster in the present decade. Economic and social matters are involved too, suggesting that a comprehensive, interdisciplinary approach is more appropriate, using more methodologies to grasp the concept of Central and Eastern European migratory patterns. Based on the wide range of secondary sources, a concept of immigration from the East was developed. The model summarises the drivers and outcomes of labour migration, complemented with the closely related factors' link to each other.

3. Conducting research and results

3.1. Pillars of migration

A country's history also roots in cultural characteristics and these characteristics influence, if not determine the future of a nation (House et al, 2004). Throughout history, nations encounter more or less the same external happenings, and yield a response to them. This reaction will shape the environment, so it plants the seed of the "next" external happening. This particular response is defined by cultural traits. In this respect, we recall the demeanour of welcome of labour migrants as an instance.

Corruption and nepotism also derive from history (Sadaf et al, 2018). After evaluating their impact, Woolfson (2010) claimed that the lack of trust lies in the governing bodies, and the consequent aversive feelings about the future of the country generate emigration. These findings were supported by Simionescu (2016) and Kroeger (2015) as well. Inauspicious social environment evolved in every post-communist country since the 70's, but it remained tacit until the actual transition to market economy and democratisation had not started (Rausser et al; 2018; Papadopoulos, 2011).

Religion and linguistic features are important pillars of culture and play a significant role when choosing the destination country (Adsera & Pytliková, 2015; De Vita et al, 2014). Researchers found that labour migration are more intensive among states with more similar

spoken languages (Chiswick & Miller, 2014). It is empirically supported by Gödri (2017), Cseh-Papp et al (2018) that without a basic knowledge of the host country's language (and a brief insight of its history and current institutional system), the integration cannot happen. Cultural assimilation, "cultural integration" is also inevitable to build trust among the counterparts.

Sending countries with higher weight on tertiary sector, releases more labour migrants, because this sector is attributed with highly educated human capital and with the excessive need for information transfer (Iveroth, 2012). Putting it otherwise: if the state's tertiary sector is prominent, it is likely to be explained by a relatively well-educated population in general. On the other hand, the service sector holds a comparative advantage for native workers against foreigners, because of the emphasis on communication (Foged & Peri, 2016).

Regarding the cultural matters and Hofstede's "masculinity" (Hofstede, 1997, 2018), we can talk about the "glass ceiling" phenomenon. The gender roles are more severely distinguished in the eastern world; one can think of Eastern Europe, the Middle East (Arabic states) or the Far East, especially of the extremely conservative Japan. Gender differentiation is behind the wage gap between females and males that is narrower in Belgium, than in Hungary for instance (Boll & Lagemann, 2018). So, evidently, females can expect better salaries. However, according to a forecast, the gaps are closing Europe-wide (Shmulyar & Spehar, 2014).

The analysis of the importance of culture was emphasised by Belot and Ederveen in 2015, who evaluated the statistical correlation between culture, language, religion and migration through regression and the calculation of the corresponding elasticities. Results were the followings:

- 1 percent of linguistic distance lowers migration flow with 0.76 percent,
- 1 percent of religious distance lowers migration flow with 0.29 percent,
- 1 percent of cultural distance lowers migration flow with 0.34 percent.

0.76 percent means that language is almost deterministic for labour migration. The evidence was supported by Cseh-Papp et al. (2018). They found that the absolute majority of migrants chose foreign employment because of "family reasons" (38 percent) or "personal reasons" (20 percent), while "economic reasons" were marked the most rarely. We surmise no linguistic difference within families.

One should not neglect to consider institutional obstacles and labour immigration policies. Legal restrictions are quite the opposite of culture-related characteristics, as they can vary on a "daily basis", while culture and ethnicity does not. Belot and Ederveen (2015) evaluated the restrictiveness of immigration laws and their achieved effect. In the World Competitiveness Yearbook's data, immigration regulation ranked from 0 to 10. In the theoretical model, number 10 refers to a barrier-free entry and 0 refers to the intention of total prevention of immigration. Denmark (7.73) and Luxembourg (7.55) are the most welcoming countries, while Switzerland (4.32) and Austria (5.34) are the less opened. As the legislation of the EU is obligatory for each member state, one might think that openness should not vary with the Union. However, the EU Directives come to force only if protectionist measures (Simionescu et al, 2019) are made explicitly and in this case, they are bound to fail. That is exemplified by David Cameron's unsuccessful efforts to "renegotiate the economic integration and freedom" to the UK (Schiffauer & Schiffauer, 2017). However, it is suggested by Simionescu et al. (2019) that novel foreign policy should not restrain the immigration of workforce into the country regardless of its quality; both are advantageous on their own. UK has shortage in low-skilled labour force, and high-skill labour force brings innovation potential. Concerning third-country workers, member states are sovereign to shape their own legal practice.

As far as psychological profiles are concerned, labour migrants are generally young people, who do not have fixed perspectives about their future, neither in relation of work, nor settlement (Glorious et al, 2013; Vdovtsova, 2008). They usually seek adventure, new experiences and their parents fund their trips, so they are not pressured by financial burdens.

The above covered viewpoints - culture, language, religion, ethnicity, psychology and jurisdiction - imply that migratory patterns cannot be explained solely by economic factors, even if we talk about “labour” migration.

3.2. Time factor of migration

During our research, we frequently encountered a geographically widespread pattern, which is temporary-circulatory labour migration or mobility (Illés & Kincses, 2009; Wallace, 2002). A more recent study acknowledged that a “New European Migration” evolved since the millennium, Strockmeijer, de Beer and Dagevos, (2019) based their study on a sample of labour migrant workers in the Netherlands, whereby they returned home after their commitment finished and later resumed to the destination state by time. The new practice can be marked as temporary and return migration (Engbersen & Snel, 2013). Opened borders within the continent, cheap means of transport, from car-sharing to low-cost airlines, have eliminated the need to acquire a long-term residence in the target country (Weltevrede et al 2009).

Based on the length of stay and purpose of migration, a typology was invented by Eade, Drinkwater and Garapich in 2007. They took a sample of Polish labour migrants in the UK and divided them into four clusters: storks, hamsters, stayers and searchers (*Table 1*).

Table 1. Categorisation of Polish labour migrants in the United Kingdom

Name of category	Storks	Hamsters	Searchers	Stayers
Share of the sample	20%	16%	42%	22%
Duration of stay, frequency of visits	2-6 month of stay	variable in length, but uninterrupted stay ¹	unknown	permanent settlement
Occupation	low-skilled		all kinds ²	all kinds, improving by time
Purpose of immigration	pay tuition fees at home	capital-raising for investing at home	ambition, acquiring social and financial capital too	pursuing high social status and mobility
	financial incentives; maximize earnings in the shortest possible time		intrinsic motivation; acquire language skill, learn sustaining oneself, experience living in a global city	

Source: Eade et al (2007). *Class and Ethnicity: Polish Migrant Workers*. Swindon: Economic and Social Research Council, London, completed with the present authors' personal input, indicated by the indices


This classification confirms that the majority of labour migrants stay only for a limited period of time and then leave, once they achieved their specific or undefined goals. A cumulative number of 78 percent is associated with the temporary migration. From searchers'

¹ We can suppose that they stay for more years because, their purpose/strategy demand longer duration.

² They are highly qualified, therefore, able to switch between workplaces with relative ease.

perspectives, there is a higher chance for leaving the target country sooner or later, because they seek adventure and this intention sprouts them elsewhere. It means 64 percent of the sample is motivated by non-economic factors, so this study is another evidence for the subsidiarity of monetary rewards. Consequently, this fact undermines the neo-classical theory. Pronk (2015) prolongs that the longer time someone lives abroad, the less likely he will leave. In every fifth year, the likelihood of returning home drops by 5 percent, the inverse relationship between longer stay and lower chance to leave is supported by another recent study (Simionescu et al, 2019).

In relation to the frequency of low-paid occupation-takings on behalf of migrant workers, we can think of agriculture, construction industry or other seasonal works in domestic services like hospitality, that demands excessive labour force only in a particular time of the year. Excluding agriculture, only construction and hospitality account for employing 44 percent of labour migrants (Eade et al, 2007). *Graph 2.* confirms that especially CEE labour migrants tend to work solely periodically in the target state.



Graph 2. Number of Employees from Abroad in the Netherlands in Quarterly Breakdown (Thousand People)

Source: based on *Statistic Netherlands (2019)*, own compilation

Graph 2 shows that the “popular” period is the summer. That is in line with the peak periods of the mentioned branches. It also reflects the significance of institutional barriers, transportation cost and distance. These obstacles hinder non-European labour force’s commuting to a far greater extent.

85 percent of Polish labour migrants returned home after their provisional commitment in Western-Europe had come to an end. 60 percent of CEE citizens returned home after less than six months (Statistic Netherlands, 2018).

From Christian’s interdisciplinary dissertation (2014), we deduced that there is no reason for assuming difference in the cases of other Eastern European countries. Simionescu et al. (2019) paper about the UK and CEE, offers an empirical evidence for this statement. For instance, Cseh-Papp et al. (2018) stated the same about Hungary. Potential employees are provided with fixed-term contracts. It is the usual protocol if expatriates and multi- or transnational companies are concerned (e.g. TATA, IBM etc.) Moreover, we can broaden the whole explanation beyond the EU, namely to Ukraine (Vollmer; 2016) or to Russia (Molodikova, 2008b). Geographically and culturally they are still marked as “Eastern Europe”.

CEE statistical offices have unreliable records, because they have been neglecting the investigation of temporary, cyclical migratory practice (Vollmer, 2016; Simionescu, 2016; Sokolowicz & Lishchinsky, 2018). For the detection of this research gap, the financial crisis and the military conflicts with Russia are to be “commended”. After them, the Ukrainian labour migrants in Poland and in the whole EU soared drastically (Bilan, 2011). In association with the Russian military intervention, we confirmed that labour migration is not purely economic.

From the cited studies, one can comprehend that the exercise of temporary-circular migration called and calls for examination, which is exemplified by the blank spots in some official records this field is endowed with less attention than justifiable. The problem, aside from the non-monetary and hardly measurable incentives behind labour migration, lays in the structural conditions and technological tools facilitating mobility and improving in an ever-increasing pace. Therefore, gaining accurate and actual figures is extremely challenging, but the existence of the growing tendency of cyclical migration is unquestionable. Regardless of how long they might stay, they have to be enabled to release their contribution through a comprehensive integration process (Simionescu, 2016).

3.3. Economic impact of labour migration on the receiving countries

Several studies suggested that if an individual is mobile internationally, (s)he is also outstandingly flexible, when internal migration is concerned (Cadena & Kovak, 2016). This ability is associated with young, unmarried and educated people. Their significant contribution, in adjustment to regional labour market shocks, was recently tested by Basso, D’Amuri and Peri (2019). They simulated a 1.9 percent drop in employment in an euro area state (according to the authors, it is irrelevant in which one). It ringed further until the employment rate has fallen by 13 percent. Results showed that the extent in absorbing the shock was seven times bigger on the part of a purely migrant mass, than it was of natives. That suggests that a higher share of migrant workers in the population provides a substantial flexibility in alignment to the movements of labour market. The same has already been indicated 10 years ago (Longhi et al, 2008).

From the relative education of labour migrants, another direct consequence originates their innovative contribution to the host country (D’Amuri & Peri, 2014; Alesina et al, 2016). The positive correlation between high diversity of birthplace and entrepreneurial performance was discovered in the UK first. Labour migrants learned in a more or less different education system, so they are equipped with new perspectives and skills (Rodríguez-Pose & Hardy, 2015; Diedrich, 2017). These novelties complement the native intellectual capital. Open-mindedness, distinctive abilities, wider social linkages and a more advanced problem-solving skill of citizens, who prior had to establish themselves in a foreign environment far from their comforting homes, strengthen efficiency of the synergy. Glaveanu and Taillard (2018) provided a statistical evidence of these, moreover, they found that cohesion between diversity, number and productivity of enterprises is even stronger in cases of knowledge-intensive firms. They found a 0.68 close correlation. Boubtane, Dumont and Raul (2015) reported that 1 percentage point increase in migrant’s share of labour force is associated with 0.4-0.5 percent rise in productivity. This is rooted, at least partially, in occupational stratification as mentioned above (Kerr & Mandorff, 2015).

Entrepreneurial propensity and innovations trigger a self-strengthening progress. Increased productivity leads to higher yields and more profit. That creates a fruitful investment climate. As a particular area develops, it is going to attract more labour force by abundant job opportunities (Glaveanu & Taillard, 2018). In Hungary, 60 percent of foreigners concentrated around the capital (Cseh-Papp et al, 2018). The same was observed in Poland,

and enhanced the implications of certain regions' "pulling power". According to OECD findings, the greatest influx of labour migrants moved to regional capitals in Poland: to Warsaw, Krakow and Poznan (OECD, 2016).

Labour migrants arrive usually after finishing their compulsory schools, so the pressure on the host state's publicly financed institutions is lessened. They return home before retirement (Dustman & Frattini, 2014). The overwhelming majority of labour migrants are in working age (Genelyte, 2018; Goldin et al, 2018).

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) revealed that the collected money of labour migrants is distributed as it follows: 20 percent on consumption, 40 percent on investment and another 40 percent is withdrawn from the domestic economy as remittances. The enriching area from that certain 40 percent of investment depends on the variety of personal motives (settlement in the host country, financial support for children, setting up business either in the receiving/sending state, etc.). Individual spending habits are unpredictable; still, increased spending raises revenue for both the public and the private sector, which is ultimately beneficial for each counterpart (Wadsworth et al, 2016).

UK-related researches proved that unemployment rate is decreasing as the result of persistent immigration into the island (Simionescu et al, 2019). It is composed of more elements. The two most remarkable are: the greater female participation in the labour market (Peri, 2012; Goldin et al, 2018; Chreim et al, 2018), and the labour force with comparatively more modest pretensions. Supply motivates labour-intensive investments (Bördös et al, 2016). Gödri (2017) reported improved labour market indicators in Hungary too: high employment and better wages. Its drawback, however, is that it eliminates the urge for both technological and human capital improvements, such as trainings and post-graduate studies (Pessoa & Van Reenen, 2014).

The positive culminations are in overweight regarding labour force immigration. Although not all locations and layers of society benefit from it (equally). The most visible and effectual pitfalls of immigration are rather social in nature, not economical. As labour migrant compressing regions prosper, citizens residing, working there, become more and more well off, while other parts of the country, rural areas, lag behind. It stirs a vicious circle (Kieliszewski et al, 2012). Inflated financial and social inequalities give birth to unrest and that manifests in resentment towards labour migrants and xenophobia in general, like in Russia (Molodikova, 2008b). Labour migrants substitute low-skilled workers and complement high-skilled ones, which fuels the aversions against both policymakers and business elites. Degradation of social services and the environment is also assigned to migration by public opinion, however, like explained above, they act as net contributors to the governmental budget (Simionescu et al, 2019), so the crucial point is how those extra resources are distributed by the competent governmental organisations (Simionescu, 2016).

Conclusively, labour migration benefits the receiving countries (Cseh-Papp et al, 2018), despite the bad faith about them (Fleischer, 2017). This controversy has to be addressed by further studies to support perspicacity and to resolve conflicting empirical results. Some interviewees did not experience discrimination at their workplaces or they were simply reluctant to speak up, as the authors noted (Cseh-Papp et al, 2018). In other paper, interviewees reported about discriminatory behaviour from the natives (Fleischer, 2017).

3.4. Economic impact on the sending countries

Central Europe is in the position of a sending and a receiving region simultaneously. In accordance with the principles of neo-liberal market economy, labour force migrates where it is in shortage and thus the rewards are higher, so uneven geographical distribution is bound

to vanish (Simionescu et al, 2019). But even if it works like that in practice, until the balance gets in place, there are mainly negative side effects to face with.

The most frequently cited phenomenon featuring sending countries is “brain drain”. The highly qualified and young generations are primarily involved in emigration. It is also regarded as “brain waste”, because vocational occupations are taken in the host country by graduated people (Hazans, 2013). Leaking of knowledge leads to the absence of implementation at home. Western countries expropriate their competitive advantages by receiving first-hand innovations. On the contrary, Strielkowski and Sanderson (2013) observed the opposite: Ukrainian migrants usually take jobs in the same sector in CEE countries as they would have taken at home. However, upon the recovery of emigrants, the absorbed new abilities and ideas boost knowledge transfer in the origin countries, investing, spreading new technologies and launch new high-end products (Gibson & McKenzie, 2010). Emigrants’ immaterial capital or “social remittances” are invaluablely useful intangible resources: relationships, linguistic competence, and problem-solving sense and so on (Strielkowski et al, 2018). Rausser and his co-authors (2018) highlight another remarkable feature of these non-monetary remittances: they circulate upon visiting the emigrated relative and communicating with them. Yet, informal remittances are poorly studied.

It has been discussed earlier that remittance serves as an engine for economic growth and better environment (Rausser et al, 2018). Gibson and McKenzie (2010) found that the typical yearly value of remittance is approximately 5000\$. (It refers to the money transferred from a Western European to an Eastern European country.) Earnings received in a foreign country but spent somewhere else raises purchasing power parity (Grenčíková et al, 2018) and thus leads to higher living standards (Rausser et al, 2018). However, the drawback attached to it is dependency. Emigrated citizens and their families account for a substantial part in the turnover of the housing industry and renovating real estates for example, it is true also for additional durables (Rausser et al, 2018). Hence, if their emigrated relatives would not found them, the mentioned branches suffer.

Böröcz (2014) analysed the relative share of remittances in a country’s GDP. He found a rapid growth: the overall sum in 1999 (~8 percent) doubled in five years worldwide. Since 2004, the rate was stagnating around 15 percent until 2010, and then it started to increase again (Unctad, 2015). Strielkowski et al. (2018) and Rausser et al (2018) reported that worldwide sum was 580 billion USD in 2014, 3.5 percent higher than last year (World Bank, 2015). They also found that the cash inflow of remittances were a more stable fund during the Great Recession, than the FDI in developing states in terms of GDP and consumption. Obviously, higher the total value of remittances is, the more dependent and vulnerable the domestic economy is. CEE countries are generally the beneficiaries of remittances. Yet, Böröcz (2014) illustrated that CEE’s remittance-dependency are lower than it is in non-EU member countries in South-Eastern Europe. That was explained by their relatively underdeveloped economy (Rausser et al, 2018). In addition, remittances inflate domestic currency, pushes up prices, eventually, fuels emigration (Cohen, 2005). The authors argue that governments should work out a way to channel remittances to investments rather than consumption.

We concluded that a certain fiscal contribution is achieved through emigration, but other potential sources of the governmental budget is out of reach through the lack of taxable working hours (Schiffauer & Schiffauer, 2017). The financial coverage for welfare systems, such as pension schemes and health care in the first line, are underfunded and unsustainable (Hazans & Philips, 2010; World Bank, 2015). The crisis of these areas is a self-accumulating process. Bad social conditions and the insufficiency of the social system force young talents to seek livelihood somewhere else. Moreover, through labour migrants “got used to” better salaries abroad, their willingness to work falls dramatically upon returning home; apart from


that, some of them had collected enough money to relieve their family from the burden of working for a considerably meagre amount of compensation in their homes (Sokolowicz & Lishchynskyy, 2018).

Losing job motivation results in the shortage and sectoral disproportions of domestic labour market (Eurofound, 2013; Hazans, 2013). According to Grenčíková, Skackauskienė and Spanková (2018), the most affected industries by labour deficit in CEE are: science and research, automotive, engineering, construction, electrical, IT, trade and services and health care. Further consequence is the degradation of depopulating areas, especially when the competent organisations spend less on the maintenance of infrastructure, resulting from the lack of municipal revenues, respectively. Rural areas are essentially disadvantaged in this manner.

Quantitative analysis showed a tight connection between emigration and high mortality and declining birth rates (Sipaviciene & Stankuniene, 2013). It accelerates the aging of the population, because labour migrants are usually in the age of family foundation, and they postpone it in exchange for attractive carrier perspectives abroad. One might perceive that the aging of the population is offset in Western Europe, but these expectations were also mistaken, due to the extended life expectancy.

4. Model of immigration from the East

Based on our study, we can construct the model of immigration from the East (Graph 3).



Graph 3. Model of immigration from the East

Source: Own editing

Drivers of immigration can be identified as follows. The industrialisation is gaining momentum in the Middle and Far East, particularly in China, the middle layer of the society is enabled to gather some wealth. It is due to new investments that require labour force. Providing them, in return, stable remuneration. However, enormous population and labour

surplusage are still acute problems. Thus, wages in Europe or US are still attractive. Those citizens, who were saving enough capital, became able to cover the (initial) expenditure of taking a job on another continent. The government also promotes and spends on acquiring “western skills” and the establishment of connections, which meant to facilitate investments abroad.

Culture and Ethnicity: Would-be emigrants target countries which bear cultural and ethnic similarity with them. Smaller linguistic distances and cultural conformity (from common history) greatly unburden labour migration. Apart from emotional aspects, common history often results in an analogous legal system (continental or Anglo-Saxon) that is easier to comprehend and adapt to.

Changing Economic and Political Situation: Labour migration is basically driven by financial premises. Analysis overwhelmingly underpins that labour migration is beneficial especially for the host country. In certain situations, when abundant workforce is only temporarily needed (research projects, joint ventures, agriculture, hospitality), such gaps are filled by highly mobile workers. The economy is cyclical. Despite the advantages, during recession, when people struggle for work opportunities, hostility and xenophobia against labour migrants persevere, that at least tacitly force them to leave the foreign country.

Schengen Area: After the ratification of the Schengen Treaty, labour force of the post-Soviet states has started to wander to Northern and Western Europe. Within the EU, protectionist measures are prohibited and the free movement of labour force is granted. It includes the reduction of administrative costs and time. No work permit and visa are necessary for example. Upon the ill memories of WWII, nationalism is discouraged, so people from other cultures and countries are “officially” welcomed.

Geographical proximity: Europe is relatively small. Distances and travel times are small as well. New means of public transport (car-sharing, low-cost airlines) have made (regular) travels and commuting financially affordable and simpler through common market within the EU.

Psychology: Psychological incentives are varying through one’s lifetime. In general, people in their younger age are flexible, seeking adventure and easily establish relationships and a diverse social network. But as they fund a family and want to retire, they move back home. As a consequence of lengthened carrier building, propensity to bring up (more) offspring decreases and being postponed.

5. Discussion

Since the collapse of the Soviet Regime, CEE countries have experienced massive emigration waves. But recently, upon the liberalization of border control, immigration is also on a rising track. Statistics unanimously indicate the growing number of Asian people in the continent. Due to the urging population boom and the increased financial reserves, people from other continents have started to seek live hood elsewhere. Two fundamental issues determine the future of the continent: aging population and labour shortage. Of course, these elements are not independent. The phenomenon is durable and worthwhile to be endowed with more attention from research communities, what are representing more disciples. CEE countries have to prepare for the integration of the newly arrived and anticipated labour force and therefore, providing ground for their contributions. Presenting such concepts is one of the main responsibilities of employers and policy-makers in the twenty-first century.

The next step, that might be a parallel task to integration, is to measure its efficiency. We recommend two basic ways to do so, with regard to the scope and limitations of the present paper. One is reflecting to the international scale. We agreed with Schiffauer and Schiffauer’s (2017) conclusion, according to which the volume of migration within the

European Union is a reliable indicator for the success or failure of integration efforts. We note, however, that third-world nationals should be approached differently. We stem that from their largely different ethnic, cultural features and political background. The other measuring method we suggest, on the micro level, is the analysis of corporate value within organisations that employ foreign labourers. Logically, the more efficient the integration projects were, the more contribution, value-added the employees could serve with.

Finally, we discovered an issue that is more societal in its nature. Public opinion toward migrants is not positive and explicitly negative during economic downturns. On the contrary, we claim that economic benefits of labour immigration overweight disadvantages. As the Brexit poses the first precedent since WWII when the economic and social ties in Europe loose, and integration tumbles, its short- and long-term consequences provide prolific topics for researchers applying various insights.

6. Conclusion

As one overviews the statistical datasets and national records, it becomes obvious that international migration is a serious, pertinacious process. We concluded that, even if labour migration was fuelled by income disparities in the world, economic conditions did not hold a main role when defining the concept behind the phenomena. Following this trait, we evaluated the influence of social networks, cultural background and ethnicity, linguistic and institutional barriers, and found that their impacts were just as important as economic matters. We noted that - except for institutional barriers - each listed item was a durable thing, as oppose, pursuing financial interests could be attributed only to certain periods of an individual's life.

This conclusion turned us to our second main area of analysis, to temporary-cyclical migration or mobility. Cyclical, circular labour migration was supported by several factors. Variable psychological motivations, forgery of social networks, ethnical and historical background, and last, but not least, institutional barriers and central policymaking. We also emphasised that technologically travelling is cheaper and faster than ever. As a consequence, labour force migrates intercontinentally easier, more comfortable and more frequent.

We also scrutinised economic reasons and outcomes, respectively. Quantitative empirics and statistical analysis were collected to measure economic consequences. Several detailed aspects were merged, from macroeconomics to regional differences, from beneficiaries of the whole process to the net losers, from changes in the labour market to resulting demographic characteristics. The preparation for integration of labour migrants is a permanent task for all employers and policymakers, as well as for the entire society.

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