
ECONOMICS

Sociology

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**WILL BEING DETERMINE
CONSCIOUSNESS
OF THE UKRAINIANS, OR WILL
CONSCIOUSNESS DETERMINE
THEIR BEING**

ABSTRACT. The essence of the issue, which is presented in this study, can be put into a question: is the process of formation of the civil society in Ukraine in post-communist conditions in line with cause-and-effect relations as opposed to the makrosocial situation in the state?

Referring to the assumption of Edward Shils (1994), the "society" is the component of the triad, the other elements of which are the "economy" and the "state" or a "political entity". A characteristic feature of the civil society is that its elements are interconnected due to the collective self-awareness of joint participation in the society and the awareness of co-responsibility for the common good.

The article presents the analysis of the social movement referred to as Euromaidan/Majdan (2013-2014) as an expression of civic activity, preceded by the intensity of discontent, claims, social unrest resulting from the economic and political crisis in the state.

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Introduction. The essence of the issue

The transition from communism to democracy that took place in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980-ties and 1990-ties was and is the subject of various studies and analyses. At the beginning of considerations related to the civil society one should pay attention to the gap between the relatively rapid institutional change and slow changes in the public consciousness. The establishment of political pluralism is a formal and legal decision, whereas the quality of political life, the responsibility for the state, the sense of community – related to the political maturity of citizens – is acquired, constructed, not established authoritatively. K. Michalski (1994) defines civil society in opposition to the state – the communist state, which tries to subject all the spheres of social life to its control. The concept of "civil society" becomes a measure of the ability to mount social resistance, of the awareness that others participate in the same "we", and therefore shared responsibility for the common good.

This article defines the area of theoretical and research interest, which includes the issues of civil society in Ukraine in conditions of changing social, cultural, political reality

after 1991. M. Riabczuk in his work draws attention to the deepening crisis of confidence to the state and public institutions in the new democratic Ukrainian State. After the fall of the communism and the break-up of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian citizens had high expectations of democracy. After more than two decades since Ukraine became independent, the criticism and discontent related to its actual shape intensified. Both among the experts and in everyday discourse, the thesis about the deficit of democracy or its unreality gains popularity, which reduces public confidence in the power of their own voice, in the ability to take the grassroots initiative, in self-organization in order to achieve the common good, and thus the quality of the civil society.

The essence of the issue, which is presented in this study, can be put into a question: is the process of formation of the civil society in Ukraine in post-communist conditions in line with cause-and-effect relations as opposed to the macroeconomic situation in the state? The article presents the analysis of the social movement referred to as Euromaidan (2013-2014) as an expression of civic activity, preceded by the intensity of discontent, claims, social unrest resulting from the economic and political crisis in the state. The further section of the article shows the results of own studies of the national awareness in Zaporozhe, conducted in 2007-2010 (the project itself lasted until 2012), which showed an issue of the civic society in Ukraine and a need to analyse it more deeply. The civic society, referred to in the Section "Ukrainian imagined community" was active, among others, during the events accompanying the Orange Revolution in 2004 or the Euromaidan 2013-2014, hence an attempt was formed to link these events (forming/awakening of the civic society) with the macrosocial situation of the country (section "Macrosocial situation in Ukraine") as a stimulant for the social revolt, protest of the citizens against the ruling power at that time and the social injustice (section "Social resistance as a pursuit for restoring justice").

1. Ukrainian imagined community¹

By proclaiming independence in 1991, Ukraine was formed as a territorial and political unit. The basis of belonging to the state has become a "civilian" category of citizenship rather than ethnicity. The concept of the "Soviet nation", based on the coexistence of different ethnic, cultural, and linguistic groups, has been replaced by the concept of "the people of Ukraine" as a political nation².

Within the conditions of existing cultural, linguistic, religious, and political differences, the issue of national community, the widest awareness of "us" and the division between "us" and "them" becomes essentially important. The perception of Ukraine as the state and society divided by the language, political option, ethnicity, is present not only in Ukraine but also beyond its borders. Superficiality and often a simplistic perception of Ukraine is indicated, inter alia, by M. Riabczuk (2015, pp. 3-4), as he writes that "In academic circles, there is consensus that: a) Ukraine is not divided clearly and unequivocally, or according to the characteristics of the language or ethnic groups; b) language, ethnicity and political orientations significantly correlate with each other, but do not overlap; c) it is difficult to identify a clear dividing line on the territory of Ukraine (...); and in the end, what is most important, d) the idea of the division of Ukraine is almost not supported (except for

¹ The research results presented in this section are cited on the basis of the monograph "Between Ukrainianness And Sovietness. Ukrainians, Russians and Bulgarians in Zaporizhia", Nomos Publishing House, Krakow, 2015. In 2007-2010, field research was conducted in Zaporizhia as a cultural borderland. The study involved multi-ethnic communities at the Zaporizhia, with a rural-urban division due to the nature of the settlement of certain villages by the representatives of the most numerous ethnic groups living in the area under research – the Ukrainians, Russians and Bulgarians. The overall number of in-depth interviews was 120.

² The issue about the sources of the formation of nations: cultural, the foundation of which is genealogy, and political, as a community of citizens.

Crimea) by the people of this country". If we talk about the divisions in Ukraine, they have neither the nature of the language, neither are they religious nor ethnic; the divisions are due to the recognized values.

Being a Ukrainian becomes a matter of choice, which is allowed by the concept of a political nation (see: Karnaukh, 2015). The choice of being a Ukrainian is contingent on the values of post-modernity, which is subjectively determined by nationality. The analysis of field studies carried out in 2007-2010 at the Zaporizhia among multi-ethnic local communities has allowed to formulate the following conclusion:

The model of post-modern ethnicity recognizes ethnicity as a dynamic, variable phenomenon, i.e. such that is not granted to an individual once and for all. "Blood and soil" laws are the principles of modernism; in the post-modern model, "the law of the individual's will" governs, although will is also subject to certain objective conditions. The right approach will be to determine the Ukrainian nation as the state *between* communism and post-modernity (Karnaukh, 2015, p. 258).

The above mentioned studies enabled to note the fact that the awareness of the Ukrainian origin among the people surveyed does not interfere with the frequent bivalence and even polivalence in the case of ethnic and cultural diversity on the border (see: Kłoskowska, 1996). There is no conflict between the declaration of belonging to the Ukrainian nation and the fact that a person does not use the Ukrainian language, or does not know Ukrainian well, or the fact of his functioning on the verge of cultures (Karnaukh, 2015, p. 251).

It seems that in the post-Soviet Ukraine the opposition of the Russian and Ukrainian idea is not the issue. In fact, the main line of a dispute takes place between the Ukrainian and the Soviet idea; it is evidenced by the fact that some of the people surveyed in the Zaporizhia identified themselves not as the Russians, Bulgarians or Ukrainians (having ethnic roots), but as the "Soviet people". The term *homo sovieticus*, used by Józef Tischner, comes to mind: "the client of communism, enslaved by the communist system, consumed goods that communism offered him. Three values were particularly important to him: work, share of power, self-esteem. Owing them to communism, *homo sovieticus* became addicted to communism; which does not mean that at some point he had not contributed to its overthrow" (1992, p. 125).

People who have a sense of nostalgia for the Soviet era as well as people who positively evaluate some values of "socialism (communism)" are just an example of *homo sovieticus* described by Tischner. The citizens of the new state demanded and expected from the "new" political elite meeting these needs, which communism guaranteed; they expected something more, still waiting for help from the state, for the guarantee of stability and justice.

Man of the period of socialism was addicted to work, not only as a means of subsistence, but also due to the belief that there is "someone" who cares about the working man, which gave him a sense of security and indispensability. A man had a sense of belonging to the community, he was a member of the *collective*: "It might be that such 'socialization' restricted man's freedom, but gave it significance. A man knew what his life purpose was. Who he sacrificed himself to" (ibid, p. 126).

It was an illusion, which became rooted deeply in the consciousness of the people of that period. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, generations of communism (villagers slightly later – after the collapse of the collective farms in the mid-nineties) suddenly felt that they were "nobody's": only yesterday everyone was "socialized", and today he or she is "nobody's" (ibid). Therefore, can we be surprised by such, and no other, consciousness of the Ukrainian people? I agree with the following Hrycak's arguments:

In many ways, today's Ukraine is suffering from the same diseases as young independent states. (...) Yet, for many reasons Ukrainian problems are deeper and the tasks

are more complex. The postcolonial legacy of Ukraine is determined by the fact that the Soviet Union was not only an empire, but also a totalitarian state. (...) If Ukraine had the experience of the interwar independence, as the Baltic republics, or at least remained outside the Soviet influence for a shorter period, as Galicia, then the degree of its Sovietization would be much weaker, and the suffering of the transition period less severe (2000, pp. 339-340).

As for sharing of power, or at least the feeling of participation, *homo sovieticus* now feels that he is a "leaf tossed by the wind" (Tischner, 1992, p. 127). The sense of dignity was lost, which disappeared along with the sense of "indispensability", "social stability" and "socialization". On the basis of the results of research, a certain thesis emerges that *homo sovieticus* is a man whose consciousness is determined by existence, i.e. in order to be, he has to have something³. The new state, due to the fact of not meeting (or not meeting in total) the commitment to provide basic needs of a citizen, lost the confidence of citizens, most of whom are guided by the principle of "pragmatism", by the principle of "conditional love" to the state.

The concept of *homo sovieticus* should be regarded as a certain ideal type, used for the purpose of research material analyses. This does not mean, however, that it does not exist in reality. Depending on certain circumstances, this mentality is featured by some Ukrainian citizens, especially by residents of the eastern and southern territories. Confirmation of this fact is not a bad thing. A different situation is when such a feeling becomes a cause of some choices: "Let us imagine that it is an election day. *Homo sovieticus* is faced with an either-or issue: either his being will determine his consciousness or his social being will determine his consciousness..." (Tischner, 1992, p. 129).

The research in Zaporizhia showed that the state as an institution uniting its residents (citizens) continues to have a crucial meaning. Citizenship is a kind of contract between the nation and the state (Aleksander, 2010). Citizenship is the institutional form of solidarity. "This term refers to a particular category of human relations, which can and should be clearly distinguished from the category of economic relations" (Szacki, 1997, p. 29). It constitutes and expresses its full formal membership and ties between its owners and the national state; it bases on belonging to the state or the nation, or both, and provides the individual with an identity – a "citizen". It is a theoretical point of perceiving citizenship. In practice, there are those who, pointing to citizenship, do not feel more solidarity with fellow citizens and loyalty to the state. Indeed, having citizenship does not necessarily go hand in hand with the perception of ties with the entire multi-million nation and the state. However, in general, in the case of people surveyed in Zaporizhia, the concept of Anderson's (1997) "imagined community" proved to be true, confirmed not only in having a sense of relationship with the people of Ukraine and loyalty to the state, but also in the knowledge and acceptance of the values and ideas of symbolic culture of the given political community.

An important issue applies to people of ethnic origin. The sense of citizenship is not at odds with ethnic identity. In this sense, the sense of being a member of a nation lies in the constitutive patriotism, respecting the multiplicity of cultural forms of life at the simultaneous socialization of all citizens in the framework of a common political culture.

Therefore, the Ukrainian people, as a state nation, among the respondents is understood as a political community in which the members are related by will and by shared

³ It is perhaps too strong a word, but it reflects the mood of the subjects, how they see the surrounding reality. In 2012, the Razumkov Centre conducted an all-Ukrainian survey on "what is more important: freedom or prosperity?" 30.2% of respondents marked the answer "of course, both freedom and prosperity are important, but I could give up some of my rights and civic liberties for prosperity"; 37.3% chose the answer "of course, both freedom and prosperity are important, but I could endure some material difficulties in exchange for my own freedom and civil rights"; 32.5% of respondents feel they are a "leaf tossed by the wind" using Tischner's term; they were the ones who had difficulty answering the question: http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=611 (accessed: 16 March 2016).

conviction to live within a certain political-state order. The nation is understood here, in accordance with the *Constitution of Ukraine* (1996), as a political community of citizens that are equal before the law, regardless of their social status, origin, language or religion, which means that political citizenship is separated from ethnic or cultural identity.

The real problem of Ukraine, according to the respondents, lies elsewhere and is not associated with the concept of the nation. It concerns macro-social determinants, which have a direct impact on the low level of patriotism of the Ukrainians. The lack of social security is the cause of a neutral or less significant attitude towards the implementation of cultural needs. Ethnicity or the feeling of being a member of the Ukrainian nation becomes a value only in a situation of a certain stability ("being determines consciousness"). Thus, the attitude of the Ukrainian citizens to the state and to the process of transformation is variable and is modified on the basis of different ideologies and socio-political and economic conditions.

2. Macrosocial situation in Ukraine

Referring to the assumption of Edward Shils (1994), the "society" is the component of the triad, the other elements of which are the "economy" and the "state" or a "political entity". The economic situation, which is reflected, among other things, in the fall of Ukraine's position in the world rankings⁴, the high cost of living in the country (higher than in Poland or the US) and the returning fear for the future of oneself and one's family, makes the people immerse in a sense of lack of justice, which is not conducive to creating a community. The idea of justice includes the issues of an equitable distribution of wealth, equal opportunities in socio-economic life and equality before the law.

V. Jurchyszyn (2012, p. 38) in a report regarding the analysis of the economic situation in Ukraine and the prospects for 2012 says that "in Ukraine, due to the lack of consistency of reforms, weak economic dynamics, low motivation to work, the level of corruption is reinforced and of the social disbelief in the effectiveness of reforms". In the opinion poll carried out by Razumkov Centre about "believing in the success of reforms in Ukraine" in 2015, 30.3% of respondents marked "lack of faith", 32.2% – "lack of faith, but I still have hope", 25.6% marked the answer, which said "I generally believe, but I have doubts" and only 4.8% of respondents gave an affirmative answer⁵. According to public opinion polls of IRI Research Centre, in September 2015, 82% of respondents pointed to the deterioration of the economic situation in the state and 79% indicated the deterioration of the economic situation of their families⁶. Among the most important problems of Ukraine, in the opinion of the respondents, is "war in Donetsk" – 60%, "corruption among state employees" – 47%, unemployment – 30%. According to respondents, the problem of relations with Russia (11%), the status of the Russian language (less than 1%) remain of secondary importance for Ukraine. On the other hand, the most important issues for the subjects were: price control –

⁴ Ukraine, in the world scale (183 countries analysed) in the rankings of business support in 2012, reached the 152nd position (in 2010 it reached 147th position); according to the index of economic freedom, Ukraine reached 163rd position. According to the World Competitiveness Index, Ukraine was on 82nd position among 142 countries, which were subject to analysis, while a number of "system" indices points to the fact that the state is situated within the 20% worst rated countries in the world: the quality of institutions – 131st position, macroeconomic conditions – 112th position, expansion of the market for goods – 129th position and finances – 116th position. In addition, in relation to the years 2009-2010, the economic situation of the state clearly deteriorated. Report of the Razumkov Research Centre, http://www.razumkov.org.ua/upload/yurchyshyn_global_economy_2012.pdf (accessed: 16 March 2016).

⁵ The survey on "faith in the success of reforms in Ukraine", 2015, http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=1057 (accessed: 16 March 2016).

⁶ Report of the IRI, http://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/centr_issledovaniy_iri_obschestvenno-politicheskie_nastroeniya_ukraincev.html (accessed: 15 March 2016).

55%, the war in Donetsk – 35%, the decline in the Hryvnia exchange rate – 34%, unemployment – 34%, social policy – 31%, corruption – 24%, that is, problems of social justice.

To illustrate the proper financial position of Ukrainian families it should be indicated here what the minimum wage in 2015 was, and it was 1218 UAH (the exchange rate in March 2016 is 27 UAH per 1 US dollar). The government promised to raise the minimum wage to 1378 UAH, where the 13% increase in the minimum wage at a simultaneous 50% inflation seems quite symbolic. The difficulty of the situation deepens due to disparities in work sectors, to uneven distribution of wealth, taking into account, among other things, regional differences, i.e. industrial and non-industrial regions. The official rate of social inequality in Ukraine in 2014 was 28.2, which places Ukraine at a better position than Poland (34.9) or Russia (37.5). On the other hand, experts advise to interpret these results very carefully due to the extensive "grey zone" in Ukraine, the tax system, unfavourable for the citizens, and the level of corruption. According to the researchers, the Gini index, closest to the correct situation in Ukraine, is 42.3⁷.

Referring to the previously cited Tischner's thesis (1992), without having a secure future, a sense of social justice, citizens are not able to fight for higher goals, such as the issues of culture and national consciousness⁸. The formation of civil society in Ukraine encounters an obstacle in the form of the oligarchs and the unreality of constitutional guarantees (cf. Riabczuk, 2015, pp. 240-250). It is mainly about the apparent freedom of speech and democracy, the existence of double standards and other pathologies of democracy as the idea of freedom, equality and justice.

According to the information from Razumkov Centre (for 2012), the most important cause of socio-economic and political problems in Ukraine is high level of corruption (31.3% of respondents⁹), in the second place there was the belief that the officials care about their own interests only and not about the interests of the state (18.2%), in the third position is ignoring the Constitution and other legal regulations by the representatives of the government (14.4%), the next position stated ineffective governance of the state due to the lack of competence of civil servants (13.3), whereas 4.1% of respondents indicated the imperfection of the Constitution of Ukraine¹⁰.

Below I present the attitude of the citizens of Ukraine to democracy in the years 2004-2012 (*Table 1*). The third item is worth considering – what does it mean "for such a person like me it does not matter which system will be in the state" – does it reflect the civic passivity, that is, refraining from using the status of a "citizen"¹¹, or is it a problem of faith in the power of one's own voice (*Table 2*)?

⁷ <http://real-economy.com.ua/publication/22/9737.html> (accessed: 16.03.2016).

⁸ In 2008, a survey on what people need to be happy, in the first place the vast majority of respondents (35.6%) indicated "certainty of tomorrow", the second place was the "family" with the index 18%, the third – "money" (9.7%), and the fourth "a sense of being needed" (7.5%): http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=356 (accessed: 16 March 2016).

⁹ The main areas of corruption in Ukraine include health service – 88%, the judiciary sector – 83%, state power – 81%, law enforcement agencies – 83% tax authorities – 76%, higher education – 76%, political parties – 76%: http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=903 (accessed: 16 March 2016).

¹⁰ The reason for the difficult socio-economic and political situation in Ukraine, Razumkov Centre, 2012: http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=615 (accessed: 16 March 2016).

¹¹ I assume the term citizenship basing on Raciborski (2007, pp. 508-509) as a set of institutional social practices, which include turnout, participation in demonstrations, civic competences and the infrastructure of the civil society.

Table 1. The attitude of the citizens of Ukraine to democracy and authoritarianism (2004-2012)

	May 2004	October 2006	June 2007	February 2009	October 2010	April 2012
Democracy is the most desirable political system for Ukraine	41.0	53.5	42.8	36.6	46.9	50.9
Under certain circumstances an authoritarian regime may be better than democratic	23.0	20.8	21.5	30.0	19.1	19.6
For such a person like me it does not matter which system will be in the state	18.0	10.9	17.7	17.0	15.7	18.3
It is hard to say	18.0	14.0	18.0	16.4	18.3	11.2

Source: Razumkov Centre, http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=612 (accessed 16 March 2016).

Table 2. The influence on the representatives of the government, 2009

	Central government	Local governments
It does not depend on me at all(1)	72.4	62.8
2	17.7	22.6
3	4.3	8.2
4	1.3	2
I influence them very much (5)	0.3	0.3
It is hard to say	4.1	4.1

Source: Razumkov Centre, http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=441 (accessed 16 March 2016).

The overall assessment of democracy in Ukraine is 3 on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means dictatorship, 5 – democracy¹². Controlling the media by the oligarchs, the fact that journalists do not initiate controversial topics, double standards in the law, corruption – promote an internal dilemma. In such circumstances, there returns, not so much forgotten, Soviet fear and conviction of the powerlessness of grassroots initiatives. According to the data from Razumkov Centre, in 2008 only, 11.6% of citizens were involved in civic activities, and in 2013 this number was 8.1%¹³. The question "what may be the cause of the need to participate in civic activities"¹⁴ in 2008-2013 the following answers were obtained:

- No payments – 17.2% (21.9% in 2008);
- As far as this activity will bring benefit to me and my family – 37.4% (37.1% in 2008);
- As far as this activity will bring tangible benefits to the society – 26.4% (14.8% compared to 2008);
- If life, health and well-being of my family becomes at risk, and this activity will be aimed at the elimination of the threat – 33.2% (29.2% in 2008);
- As far as this activity will help me be recognizable – 2.3% (3.9% in 2008);
- Other – 7.3% (5.7% in 2008);

¹² The assessment of the level of democracy in Ukraine, 2010:

http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=562 (accessed: 16 March 2016).

¹³ Involvement in civic activities, 2008-2013, Razumkov Centre:

http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=367 (accessed: 19 March 2016).

¹⁴ Of those who ticked the answer "no" to the question whether they are involved in civic activities.

- It is hard to say – 20.3% (14.5% in 2008)¹⁵.

The community of fear and insecurity, the discourse of oppression, lack of trust in government institutions, weakened ability of the society to the grassroots initiatives, self-organization of people, mobilization for the implementation of some important tasks for the community, mutual aid, which is a basic feature of the civil society.

The discourse of oppression (Alexander, 2010) as a remnant of the previous communist regime, accompanying the Ukrainian society even after gaining the national independence, affects the weakness of social ties, promotes various inequalities and exclusivity of social relations.

The dissatisfaction with the weakness of the state is sometimes the reason for protests in defence of democracy and in defence of a better future for the people and their families, similarly as the Orange Revolution in 2004 and Euromaidan of 2013-2014 in Ukraine, or a cause of a complete withdrawal from political life. Below, the analysis will be presented of the social movement referred to as Euromaidan¹⁶ as an expression of the civic activity, preceded by the intensity of discontent, claims, social unrest resulting from the economic and political crisis in the country.

3. Social resistance as an attempt to restore justice

As the starting point for the analysis concerning the creation of a civil society in Ukraine one can take the Orange Revolution of 2004 and Euromaidan of 2013-2014 as the social movements which are civil in nature.

I regard protest and participation in the social movement as the strength of the society and the fact of the citizens' using not only the rights arising from (legal) citizenship, but also as duties in the form of participation in social and political life. The fact of manifesting one's views, aspirations for change, expressing one's own opinion about the situation in the state is a sign of a sense of co-responsibility of the members of a particular society for the common good (regardless of the existing social differences), which is a necessary condition for the existence of a civil society (see: Shils, 1994).

The participation in the social movement may be for different purposes: the defence of personal interests, or taking care of group interests, and at other times, the participation in the protest is almost accidental. The question is: to what extent a protest, a social movement is an attempt to restore order, security or justice, and to what extent these pose only a threat, dysfunctional social order, and the result of manipulation (cf. Sztompka, 2005, p. 285).

It is certainly used to inform about certain irregularities in the functioning of the social system and social mobilization. On the one hand, protests and social movements strengthen the democratic order, while on the other hand, they may be a disintegrating force.

The protest at Maidan in Kiev in November 2013, referred to as "Euromaidan", as well as protests in other cities in the defence of European values for Ukraine was unexpected for both the government and the opposition. A characteristic feature of the several-weeks demonstrations, in my opinion, was that the opposition were unable to take full control of the protesters (the camp of the opposition could not unite; it was represented by three political parties, divided into different interests – Batkivshchyna, UDAR and Svoboda), which can, on the one hand, testify the grassroots initiative of the event, while on the other – confirms the thesis of mistrust in the political elites¹⁷. A special role in its creation and spread was played

¹⁵ What can cause the need to participate in civic activities, 2008-2013, Razumkov Centre: http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=369 (accessed: 19 March 2016).

¹⁶ The Euromaidan /Maidan is referred to in the Ukrainian society as the Revolution of dignity.

¹⁷ With time, political parties have tried to take over the sovereignty over the movement, but in the absence of compliance among the leaders of the opposition parties, they completely failed. Beside them, there appeared

by the new media. This fact gives us a basis to conclude about who the first participants of Maidan were – we can talk about the first clear manifestation of the generation that was brought up in an independent country. They were educated people or studying¹⁸, who were looking for their own national identity and a better future for themselves and the state (see: Riabczuk, 2015, p. 243). Is it possible at this point to determine the motif of the people participating in demonstrations? Ukraine's desire to enter into the EU structures. Such a reply would be too obvious and superficial. The participation in Euromaidan can be interpreted broadly as the idealistic belief that the association agreement will help restore the institutional and legal order in the country, that it will help eradicate corruption and restore constitutional guarantees, that it will improve the functioning of the Ukrainian state. The Association Agreement, according to experts, "was the last hope to rectify the situation in a peaceful manner, that is, to force government representatives to obey the law (to stop theft, lies and deception) and to make the European Union assist in this issue" (Riabczuk, 2015, p. 242).

In 2011, public opinion polls, among the reasons that could stimulate Ukrainians to take part in legal protests (meetings, demonstrations, pickets), listed the following as the most important: price increases (42.5%), lack of payments (34.2%), low wages (29.2%), redundancy (26.9%), injustice and crime (21.6%), arbitrariness of local authorities (21.6%), defence of human rights (15.4%), foreign countries meddling in the Ukraine internal affairs (11.4%). 26% of respondents marked the category "under any circumstances"¹⁹. Thus, in the vast majority these are the reasons that fall within the concept of social justice. "Misery breeds rebellion" or more precisely, the misery that people are aware of and which they define as unfair, pushes them to revolt (see: Sztompka, 2005, p. 287). By mass protests, the Ukrainians challenged the conditions in which they lived. The consciousness of poverty and the consciousness of oppression, the belief that the lack of justice are not the natural order of this world have become the impulse to revolt.

Earlier government strategies against the protesters or those manifesting their dissatisfaction, by waiting out or suppressing initiatives, including by administratively obstructing the possibility to organize demonstrations, failed. The attempt to beat peaceful demonstrators by force, which took place on November 30, 2013, by the special police branch, encountered a different reaction than the one assumed by the government. Instead of intimidating and therefore suppressing, there was a sharp increase in anti-government sentiments and those who had so far been only remotely watching the course of events, joined them. Euromaidan of November 21, 2013, reclassified into the "Revolution of dignity" as a political and social form of protest in defence of democratic freedoms and "dignified" living conditions (see: Kyrydon, 2015, p. 18).

Retrospectively, questions can be asked and answers sought about what the identity of the protest movement was, who the protesters were? – the Ukrainians. What is meant by this term? Can the earlier event, the Orange Revolution of 2004, and the Maidan of 2013-2014 be seen as a symbol or even a chance for the state and the people of Ukraine to achieve civic and

social activists, music stars, however, they lacked a leader and a clearly declared purpose, which, for example "organized" Maidan during the Orange Revolution in 2004.

¹⁸ In the first protests in Kiev, Lviv and other cities of Western Ukraine mainly students participated. The protests were peaceful and apolitical in nature. Symbols that accompanied the protesters were two flags, one – a state flag: blue and yellow and the European flag. An important role was played at that time by the social networks that enabled interacting, providing information, slogans calling to participate in the demonstrations that were passed in social media. Only later there appeared stages, as attempts to "technically" organize the protest, from which politicians and celebrities spoke. Then, there emerged several new groups and even movements, such as "Automaidan". After some time, a religious accent came into being – on the stages of Maidan church services were conducted. Characteristically, the priests were from the outside of the Moscow Patriarchate.

¹⁹ Reasons for participating in protest actions, 2011 Razumkov Centre:
http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=584 (accessed: 19 March 2016).

national awareness, where the nation is conceived as a community of citizens regardless of the origin or language of everyday communication? A good proof of this is the language of Maidan, the participants of which had not only used modern techniques of communication, but both the Ukrainian and the Russian language (see: Kyrydon, 2015, p. 26). Language issues did not play a role of dividing the participants into the "pro-Russian" and the "pro-Ukrainian". The experts increasingly notice the lapidary nature of talking about the divisions in Ukraine due to the language and region of residence, and the need for a deeper grasp of these problems, that despite the divisions due to the recognized values and geopolitical views, in the nation of Ukraine there is something resembling the national consensus (see: Riabczuk, 2015, p. 247). On the other hand, it leaves open the question of manipulation, for example, attempts to symbolically root the protesters into the national tradition (Zaporizhian Sich or UPA tradition). Manipulation (inter alia, from the Russian side and from the Yanukovych Family) consisted in strengthening harmful and polarizing stereotypes about the inhabitants of the eastern and western Ukraine²⁰. Manipulation of the media has created a base for mutual misunderstanding, a conflict within the society, the source of which were cultural differences. But were there differences in consciousness? I have in mind the national consciousness, which I primarily understand through the prism of will (national solidarity, the awareness of being a member of the Ukrainian people, regardless of the nationality or the language of communication), then the culture. Thus, for example, during the years 2013-2014, the number of inhabitants of Ukraine, who first feel the citizens of Ukraine, increased almost by 20%: from 54% to 73%; people's identification due to their place of residence accordingly declined²¹.

When presenting the image of people who actively or passively experienced the social movement described here, a few words should be said about those who remained on the other side, i.e. those who were "dissatisfied" with the Maidan. They were the villagers, workers, representatives of the older generation, mainly, but not exclusively residents of the largest industrial cities in eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, who were primarily afraid of "worsening" the relations with Russia, of the economic sanctions, and thus, who feared the economic future of the region and their own. The revolution, as the interruption of social cohesion, is perceived here more as a defeat than a salvation for the state (cf. Sztompka, 2005, p. 281). Half of the Ukrainians believe that the state will benefit from joining the EU, 25% believe that the state will lose and 24% do not have an explicit opinion on the subject. In all age categories the support for an association agreement with the EU prevails. In contrast, a regional difference is clearly visible: as long as the inhabitants of the western and central areas strongly support the agreement with the EU – 77% and 57.5%, the inhabitants of the eastern and southern regions are less convinced of the positive impact of the European integration – 30% and 35%. The basis for a negative assessment of the membership in the EU structures in the east and south are the concerns related to worsening the relations with Russia (35%), increase in unemployment (33%), lower living standards (30%) and the loss of the Russian market (17%)²². In this case, people are afraid to lose what they already have (although they do not have much) than to lose hope of achieving what they do not yet have and can have.

On the nationwide scale, Maidan has awakened the expectations of social, political, economic changes, where the solution of economic problems (74.7%), the fight against

²⁰ Ukraine, despite a quarter of a century of functioning as a sovereign and independent state, as a nation, in spite of political or cultural differences, still lacks knowledge and experience, as well as the skills enabling it not to acquiesce to stereotypes contained in the language and to the pressure of virtual reality.

²¹ Gromadska dumka: podsumowania 2014, w: Centrum Razumkova.

²² Yak ukrayintsi otsinyuyut' evrointehratsiyu, ochikuvannya ta nastroi suspil'stva: http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/news.php?news_id=721 (accessed: 19 March 2016).

corruption (63.5%), fighting crime (33.9%), ending the war in the east of Ukraine (33.1%) are considered most important and paramount²³. By contrast, most residents of the areas affected by conflict and social anxiety in Ukraine at the moment just want to "live normally". Post-revolutionary chaos makes it more difficult to meet the basic needs (cf. Sztompka, 2005, p. 287). People are starting to dream of order and stability. The formation of a new political, social, economic order in Ukraine is a process, the end result of which remains open.

Summary. The release of mentality

By pondering in this article on the considerations related to the search for some cause-and-effect relationships between the social rebellion and the macro-structural situation in the state, we cannot ignore psychological factors. For the structural theories, revolutions are the result of tensions in the social structure, but above all of the special configurations in relationships between citizens and the state (Sztompka, 2005, p. 290). The causes of the revolution should be traced in particular at the social level, taking into account class and group relationships, and not in the citizens' heads, their mentality or attitudes (ibid). The structural theoretical and empirical orientation does not have to be in contradiction to the cultural orientation. It omits a thorough complex process that takes place "in between". Therefore, can mass protests in Ukraine of 2013-2014 and the accompanying changes be interpreted as a growing awareness of the community, co-responsibility of the Ukrainian citizens for the common good, or has the threshold of unbearable frustration, which led to the outbreak of spontaneous action been crossed? In my opinion, the macrostructural context played a key role here. It is the background for processes that occur at the micro level, that is, in the consciousness of individuals. According to A. Hulczyński, a Ukrainian economist, "the year of 1991, the Maidan in 2004 and Euromaidan share the same goals. They have the same roots, derived not only from the demand to recognize the independence of Ukraine, but also from a desire to put an end to the Soviet era, from the willingness to release our mentality from the remnants of totalitarianism" (quoted in Riabczuk, 2015, p. 243). If these observations are correct, there is a gradual transition in Ukraine from materialistic to post-materialistic values, i.e., referring to the title of the article: it is not being that determines consciousness (although it remains important), but it is consciousness that will determine the being of modern Ukraine and its people²⁴.

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²³ Hromadyany pro sytuatsiyu v Ukrayini: berezen'-zhovten' 2014, w: http://www.razumkov.org.ua/upload/2014_Ekonomika_101114_NNN.pdf (accessed: 19 March 2016).

²⁴ It is a field for further research and analysis i.a. the condition of civil society in Ukraine, which will be made by the author.

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