Journal of Scientific Papers

ECONOMICS & SOCIOLOGY


© CSR, 2008-2019
ISSN 2071-789X

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  • General Founder and Publisher:

     
    Centre of Sociological Research

     

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    University of Szczecin (Poland)

    Széchenyi István University, (Hungary)

    Mykolas Romeris University (Lithuania)

    Alexander Dubcek University of Trencín (Slovak Republic)


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Sense of fairness or hunger for revenge? It does make a difference

Vol. 16, No 1, 2023

Mihály Ormos

 

Eötvös Loránd University,

Budapest, Hungary and

John von Neumann University

Kecskemét, Hungary

E-mail: ormos.mihaly@gtk.elte.hu

ORCID: 0000-0002-3224-7636

 

Sense of fairness or hunger for revenge? It does make a difference

 

Dusán Timotity

 

WorldQuant LLC,

Budapest, Hungary

E-mail: dusan.timotity@worldquant.com


 

Abstract. We analyze the driving factors of anomalistic patterns found in experimental studies related to bargaining games. In particular, we investigate whether the well-documented deviation from self-interested behavior can be partly, or entirely, attributed to revenge rather than fairness. Although, in general, related literature does not distinguish between the two latter notions, we highlight their differences and show that revenge significantly, and independently from the sense of fairness, contributes to decision-making in ultimatum games. Moreover, we show that, when controlling for various attributes, the hunger for revenge becomes the sole driving factor for both positively and negatively reciprocal behavior, rendering the sense of fairness insignificant. Our further cross-sectional analysis yields that gender differences are also very significant; however, the measured effects of fairness and revenge remain unaffected by this latter finding.

 

Received: March, 2022

1st Revision: January, 2023

Accepted: March, 2023

 

DOI: 10.14254/2071-789X.2023/16-1/13

JEL ClassificationC71, C91

Keywords: ultimatum game, bargaining game, reciprocal behavior, revenge, fairness, gender differences